Professor Commentary: Failing to Learn from the Texas
Power Crisis,
(or, The Paradox of an Unreliable Electric Reliability
Council and a “Public Utility Commission” in a Largely
Unregulated Market)
Becky L. Jacobs*
Professors Baker and Coleman identify several reasons for the
failure of the Texas electricity system during the February Freeze of 2021,1
a failure that claimed the lives of a reported 210 people2 and caused
economic losses of $130 billion in Texas and $155 billion for the United
States.3 What the Professors do not do is in any way take issue with what
I and others believe is the root cause of the crisis, i.e., what they describe
as an “electric power system, and its regulation, [that has long been
regarded] as a model for others.”4 Rather, they focus on individual
symptoms, such as the “weather complications,”5 the “fragility” of natural
gas and electricity supply chains,6 and the exceptional difficulty of storing
those sources of energy.7 This type of silo-ized, myopic analysis is the
approach that is typically advanced in Texas and is likely to lead to more
crises when the next “unprecedented”8 winter storm or summer heat event
descends upon the state.

* Waller Lansden Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of
Law. Email: jacobs@utk.edu. I want to acknowledge my wonderful colleagues, Joan
Heminway and George Kuney, who have a talent for organizing thought-provoking
symposia and who tolerate my participation, and to the Transactions editors whose
professionalism made the event possible and enjoyable. Thanks also to all of the Business
Law Prof Bloggers who attended and stimulated the intellect.
1 Collen M. Baker & James W. Coleman, Paying for Energy Peaks: Learning from Texas'
February 2021 Power Crisis, 23 TENN. J. BUS. L. (2022).
2 FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N ET AL., THE FEBRUARY 2021 COLD WEATHER
OUTAGES IN TEXAS AND THE SOUTH CENTRAL UNITED STATES 9, (2021),
https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-outages-texas-and-southcentral-united-states-ferc-nerc-and#.
3 See, e.g., J.W. Busby et al., Cascading Risks: Understanding the 2021 Winter Blackout in Texas,
77 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI., 102106, 1 (2021).
4 Baker & Coleman, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 “Winter storm Uri, however, revealed that the interconnected natural gas and electricity
supply chains can be fragile because of their constant dependence on balancing supply
and demand in both markets.” Id. (manuscript at 3).
7 “The challenge, however, of natural gas is that, like electricity, and unlike more
traditional sources of energy such as coal and uranium, it is exceedingly difficult and
expensive to store.” Id. (manuscript at 12).
8 Joe Villasana, Gov. Abbott Warns Texans to Brace for Winter Storm ‘Unprecedented in Texas
History’, KWTX (Feb. 13, 2021, 5:23 PM), https://www.kwtx.com/2021/02/13/govabbott-warns-texans-to-brace-for-winter-storm-unprecedented-in-texas-history/.
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The Texas Model – “Exceptionalism” on Display in February 2021
Before I clarify the connections between the symptoms delineated
by Professors Baker and Coleman that contributed to the Texas Power
Crisis and the “model” system about which Texas has so broadly boasted,
let me take just a minute to provide a brief description of this model
system and some of the weaknesses thereof that the crisis exposed.
In 1999, the Texas legislature reorganized the electricity sector.9
Under the previously-existing model, a regulated utility generated,
transmitted, and sold electricity to end-use consumers within a monopoly
service territory.10 The new regime introduced competition within
wholesale electricity generation and retail consumer markets in an area that
reaches over 90 percent of its residents and that covers over seventy
percent of the state’s landmass, excluding the El Paso area, part of the
northern panhandle, and part of the region east of Houston.11 As thenGovernor Bush proclaimed: “Competition in the electric industry will
benefit Texans by reducing monthly rates and offering consumers more
choices about the power they use.”12
With oversight by the legislature, this competitive electricity
market is governed by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC), a
Commission whose members are appointed by the Governor of Texas.13
The PUC, in turn, has delegated operational authority to the Energy
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), a name so fraught after
February 2021, given how unreliable many found Texas power supply
performance to be, that I am surprised there has not been a general outcry
for it to be renamed.14 But I digress—ERCOT has responsibility for
Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA), TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 39.001–.918 (West
2022).
10 Id.
11 See Plaintiffs' Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Alternatively, Jud. Rev.
at 4–5, Exelon Generation Co. LLC v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., No. D-1-GN-21001772, 2021 WL 1587964, at *4-5 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 19, 2021).
12 Bush Signs Texas Electric Deregulation Bill into Law, DESERET NEWS (Jun. 19, 1999, 12:00
AM),
https://www.deseret.com/1999/6/19/19451445/bush-signs-texas-electricderegulation-bill-into-law; see Edward Klump, Renewables May be a Victim in Texas Grid
Revamp, E&E NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (Nov. 30, 2021, 7:05 AM), https://perma.cc/7K97V5GL. Unfortunately, some of this choice may be another victim of Winter Storm Uri.
After the storm’s blackouts, the Public Utility Commission of Texas is evaluating
intermittent generation as a critical issue as it tries to boost grid reliability, including wind
and solar energy capacity.
13 PURA, TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 12.001–.060 (West 2022).
14 PURA, §§ 39.001–.918.
9
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ensuring: (1) open access to the transmission and distribution systems; (2)
system reliability; (3) a timely and competitive retail market; and (4) an
accurate and competitive wholesale market.15 One might take issue with
how well it has fulfilled any of these responsibilities, including ensuring
the “model’s” entire raison d'être, lower-cost energy for consumers via a
competitive retail market. Even excluding the astronomical bills that some
residential consumers received in the wake of the February freeze—some
of which were reported to be as high as $17,00016—a number of
independent statistical analyses have reported that Texas residential
consumers paid $28 billion more for power between 2004 to 2019 than
state residents served by traditional utilities; rates of Texas retail electricity
providers averaged thirteen percent higher than the national average rate.17
Consumer savings aside, the February 2021 crisis certainly calls into
question ERCOT’s ability to ensure system reliability.
One aside: the Texas Railroad Commission is tangentially relevant
to the state’s electricity market. It regulates the oil and natural gas industry,
pipeline transporters, the natural gas, and hazardous liquid pipeline
industry, natural gas utilities, the LP-gas industry, coal and uranium surface
mining operations.18 Natural gas and power generation are highly
interdependent. Natural gas processing requires electricity, while natural
gas-fired power plants produce nearly half the state’s electricity.19
There are just a few more relevant background details about the
Texas “model” that are important to recall before I respond directly to
Professors Baker and Coleman. First, as the Professors mention, unlike
electricity markets in every other state in the U.S., ERCOT operates an
energy-only market that relies primarily on scarcity pricing to maintain
adequate reserves, allowing market participants to determine capacity.20 As
California can attest, this can be a risky regulatory approach,21 and Texas
PURA, § 39.151.
See, e.g., Paulina Firozi, Amy B. Wang & Peter Whoriskey, Soaring Electric Bills, Outages
in Hard-Hit Texas, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2021, at A03.
17 Tom McGinty & Scott Patterson, Texas Electric Bills Were $28 Billion Higher Under
Dereglation, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2021, 5:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/texaselectric-bills-were-28-billion-higher-under-deregulation-11614162780.
18 See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001, 102.001–.112 (West 2022).
19 Daniel Hagan, John Forbush & Aaron Bryant, The Texas Blackout: A Regulatory
Retrospective and Future Outlook, WHITE & CASE (Mar. 16, 2021),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/texas-blackout-regulatoryretrospective-and-future-outlook.
20 Baker & Coleman, supra note 1.
21 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFF., CAUSES AND LESSONS OF THE CALIFORNIA
ELECTRICITY CRISIS (2001), https://perma.cc/3R96-5N3G.
15
16
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is one of only a few markets to rely on this type of approach when it comes
to electricity supply.22 Every other U.S. state maintains electricity supply
reliability through some sort of resource adequacy requirement, such as
capacity payments.23 ERCOT does not operate a capacity market or rely
on any out-of-market resource adequacy directives but relies exclusively
on a competitive energy-only market to ensure resource adequacy.
Capacity or other “resource adequacy” markets operate differently
from Texas’ energy-only market. Their design is intended to reduce
investment risk for generators by providing revenue certainty for
generation capacity offered in the future. In the Texas competitive market,
however, there is little financial incentive to invest in additional generation
or, for that matter, in other critical items such as weather protection and
maintenance, as these investments may impact the competitiveness of a
company’s product pricing and are not recoverable in regulatorily-set
rates.24 One academic made this analogy: “Deregulation was something
akin to abolishing the speed limit on an interstate highway. … That opens
up shortcuts that cause disasters.”25 That same academic also has drawn
comparisons between the “disinvestment in electricity production [in
Texas] to the last years of the Soviet Union, or of the oil sector today in
Venezuela.”26
This comparison is particularly apt vis-a-vis the February 2021
crisis. The supply failure in Texas has largely been attributed to weatherrelated equipment failures.27 Within ERCOT’s purview, natural gas power
plants could not operate due to frozen instrumentation and pipelines.
Beyond ERCOT’s jurisdiction, but impacting its operations, state natural
gas production also suffered weather effects, i.e., freezing gathering lines,
pipelines, and well sites.28 However, there apparently was no entity,
including ERCOT, with authority to compel electricity generators and
There are others internationally, including the National Electricity Market of Australia.
See Chris Johnathon, et al., Analyzing Electricity Markets with Increasing Penetration of LargeScale Renewable Power Generation, 14 ENERGIES 7618, at *5 (2021).
23 See, e.g., Joshua C. Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Rate Regulation Redux, 168 U. PA. L. REV.
1181, 1220 (2020).
24 See, e.g., Will Englund, The Texas Grid Got Crushed Because Its Operators Didn’t See the Need
to
Prepare
for
Cold
Weather,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
16,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/02/16/ercot-texas-electric-gridfailure/.
25 See, e.g., Clifford Krauss et al., How Texas’ Drive for Energy Independence Set It Up for Disaster,
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2021).
26 See Englund, supra note 24.
27 See Hagan, Forbush & Bryant, supra note 19.
28 See id.
22
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operators to perform even minimal winterization on equipment and
facilities or to perform cold weather vulnerability reviews.29 ERCOT was
authorized to host annual weatherization workshops and to conduct
generator site visits for reviews of weatherization plans,30 but ERCOT
officials basically were limited to records reviews; they cannot impose
penalties. The arctic temperatures, combined with the regulatory
disincentives for general maintenance and weatherization, created the
conditions for a perfect storm, so to speak, that caused the “ERCOT grid
[to collapse] in exactly the same manner as the old Soviet Union. It limped
along on underinvestment and neglect until it finally broke under
predictable circumstances.”31 Texas has since attempted to address this
weatherization deficit with legislation that requires power generation
companies and exempt wholesale generators that sell in the ERCOT
market to prepare their generation assets for the provision of adequate
electric generation service during a weather emergency, legislation that
includes administrative penalties for non-compliance.32
Another important background detail about the Texas model is
that, with very few exceptions,33 the state’s electricity grid is a “bastion of
impregnable isolation,”34 separated from the remainder of the United

See, e.g., Presentation, Bill Magness, President and CEO, ERCOT, Review of
February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event — ERCOT Presentation 17 (Feb. 25,
2021),
http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/226271/Texas_Legislature_Hearings_2-252021.pdf.
30 ERCOT reports that it averages approximately 80 site visits per year (out of more than
550 generator sites). Id at 4, 17.
31 Michael Hiltzik, Amid Severe Weather and Power Crisis, Texas Legislators Stop Talking About
Secession,
L.A.
TIMES:
BUSINESS
(Feb.
17,
2021),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-02-17/texas-severe-weather-powercrisis-secession.
32 See Texas Adopts Legislation to Better Prepare Energy Market for Extreme Weather, KIRKLAND
& ELLIS: ENERGY BLOG (June 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/V74G-4CEY [hereinafter
KIRKLAND & ELLIS].
33 The Texas grid has five asynchronous ties with other interconnection, three of which
allow exchanges with Mexico and two of which allow exchanges with the Eastern
Interconnection though the Southwest Power Pool. See FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N
& N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., REPORT ON OUTAGES AND CURTAILMENTS
DURING THE SOUTHWEST COLD WEATHER EVENT OF FEBRUARY 1-5, 2011 24–25 (Aug.
2011) [hereinafter FERC-NERC 2011 REPORT], https://perma.cc/2RHX-NPX5.
34 Richard D. Cudahy, The Second Battle of the Alamo: The Midnight Connection, 10 NAT. RES.
& ENV’T 56, 57 (1995).
29
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States and Mexico.35 Its “independent power grid is a point of pride that
has been an applause line in Texas political speeches for decades.”36
“Freedom from federal regulation was a cherished goal”37 in the design of
the Texas grid, which dates back to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1935 signing
of the Federal Power Act. To avoid the jurisdiction of the Federal Power
Commission, Texas purposefully refrained from interstate electricity sales
and from interstate electric transmission.38
The Texas grid operated by ERCOT remains outside the
jurisdictional scope of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), the federal agency that succeeded the Federal Power Commission
and which now regulates interstate electric transmission.39 Proponents
contend that being functionally separated from the two national interstate
grid systems provides a laboratory for new technologies and renewables,40
but its isolation also limits its ability to import power when its own supply
is constrained. If ERCOT had been able to import supply in an emergency
situation such as occurred in February 2021, it might have mitigated some
of its crisis conditions. The Texas border city of El Paso is not connected
to the ERCOT grid; rather El Paso Electric is part of the Western power
grid that covers 14 Western states; Northern Baja, Mexico; and two
Canadian provinces. Reports indicate that, although the city’s weather
conditions were the same as the rest of the state, only a few thousand
people lost power for a brief time.41
The Symptoms
With that background, consider a few of the Professors’ symptoms
individually:
35 A Hewitt Rose, FERC Waves Red Flag Over Federal Power Act General Jurisdiction in
ERCOT, HOLLAND & KNIGHT: ENERGY & NAT. RES. BLOG (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2018/08/ferc-waves-red-flag-overfederal-power-act-general.
36 See Krauss, supra note 25.
37 Cudahy, supra note 34, at 57.
38 See Kate Galbraith, Texplainer: Why Does Texas Have Its Own Power Grid?, TEX. TRIB.
(Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2011/02/08/texplainer-why-does-texashave-its-own-power-grid/.
39 See id.
40 Chris Lewis, Cost-Competitive Renewables Poised to Grow in Deregulated Texas Market, YALE
CTR. BUS. & ENV’T: CLEAN ENERGY FIN. F. (Sept. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q6E7Y8XN.
41 Casey Cheek et al., ‘Self-Sufficient’ and Upgraded: How El Paso’s Electric Grid Weathered the
Storm, TEX. STANDARD: ENERGY & ENV’T (Feb. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/VT6GTJKW.
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● Weather Complications
Professors Baker and Coleman contend that “weather
complications (freezing issues42) were the most significant factor.”43 I
wholeheartedly agree. However, as one headline noted, and its content
scrupulously documented, the February 2021 “Texas cold snap was not
‘unprecedented,’ and it was inexcusable to be unprepared.”44 Not only has
Texas previously experienced similar widespread, weather-related
blackouts, but relevant state and company officials and system operators
were fully aware of the severe Arctic outbreak approaching in February
2021 and its potential impact on its power delivery services.45
Indeed, in February of 2021, relevant operators and officials were
warned nearly a week before it hit that the record cold winter storm on its
way to Texas could cause dramatic spikes in electricity demand and
threaten the state’s electricity infrastructure.46 The National Weather
Service in Texas began sending email briefings on the upcoming cold to
partners in the emergency management and government communities on
February 8, 2021; the Texas Division of Emergency Management began
holding statewide conference calls about the upcoming storm on February
9; and, on February 11, the forecast office of the Weather Service in
Houston specifically cautioned that “[p]ipes may freeze, burst with
damage to infrastructure. Ice accretion, wind, and power demand could
lead to power outages.”47 ERCOT’s own meteorologist sounded the alarm
in a blog post on the ERCOT website on February 12, posting that this
“period will go down in Texas weather history as one of the most extreme
events to ever impact the state. Temperatures early next week will set
widespread daily records that are likely to be the coldest experienced since

FERC-NERC 2011 REPORT, supra note 33, at 11 (explaining problems caused by the
failure to “winterize” the relevant infrastructure).
43 Baker & Coleman, supra note 1.
44 David Titley, Texas Cold Snap Was Not ‘Unprecedented,’ And It Was Inexcusable to Be
Unprepared,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
22,
2021,
11:31
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/02/22/texas-cold-snap-predictableforeseeable.
45 Andrew Freedman, Meteorologist for Texas Grid Operator Warned of The Winter Storm’s
POST
(Feb.
19,
2021),
Severity,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/02/19/texas-cold-early-warning/.
46 Id.
47 Id.
42
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the 1980s.”48 Even with this advance notice, it appears that no entity or
official informed the public of the potential catastrophe looming on the
horizon or provided advice on how best to prepare.
And this despite the fact that Texas has experienced similar severe
cold weather incidences in the past that impacted the state’s power
supply.49 While the February cold snap included one of the state’s coldest
days in more than a century, the so-called “unprecedented” power crisis
was hardly unforeseeable. During a 1989 storm in the state, wind chills
that reached 14 degrees below zero put severe pressure on electricity
systems operations, after which regulators recommended improving
winterization.50 Texas had experienced similar system disruptions,
including widespread blackouts, during a severe weather incident in
February of 2011, an incident that followed a very similar pattern of
problems present in the 2021 power crisis.51 After the February 2011
event, a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)52 investigatory report
concluded that the system winterization procedures of the Texas power
companies and natural gas producers were either inadequate or not
adequately followed.53 Seemingly little substantive was done to address
these conclusions. Nor was much—if anything—done in the aftermath of
another major cold-weather event that struck the Texas grid in 2014,
shutting down fifty generating units and sparking more inquiries into the
system's reliability.54 NERC’s 2014 investigation revealed problems similar
Chris
Coleman,
Weather,
ERCOT:
ABOUT
(Feb.
12,
2021),
https://web.archive.org/web/20210216030125/http://www.ercot.com/about/weathe
r.
49 FERC-NERC 2011 REPORT, supra note 33, at 169 (noting that there also were severe
frigid weather recordings in 1983, 1989, 2003, 2006, 2008 and 2010).
50 Ari Natter & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Texas Was Warned a Decade Ago Its Grid Was Unready
for Cold, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2021 2:55 PM), https://perma.cc/JHU8-TZ4S.
51 Hagan, Forbush & Bryant, supra note 19.
52 Following an extensive blackout in the Eastern United States and Canada in the mid1960’s, members of the electric utility industry formed a voluntary council, NERC, to
develop voluntary standards and practices to promote reliability of the interconnected
system. Mandatory reliability standards, however, were not adopted until Congress
passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005, a law that required FERC to certify an independent
Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to create and enforce mandatory reliability
standards. Pursuant to implementation procedures adopted by FERC in 2006, NERC
has delegated part of its enforcement authority to Regional Entities, over which it will
retain oversight. FERC-NERC 2011 REPORT, supra note 33, at 20–21.
53 FERC-NERC 2011 REPORT, supra note 33, at 10.
54 Jeremy Schwartz et al., “Power Companies Get Exactly What They Want”: How Texas
Repeatedly Failed to Protect Its Power Grid Against Extreme Weather, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 22, 2021,
48
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to those reported after the 2011 storms, i.e., inadequate equipment
weatherization.55 Data indicate that equipment failures affected 241 plants
during the 2011 freeze, and many of these same plants experienced
shutdowns during the February 2021 “unprecedented” winter storm.56
A report on the February 2021 system failures concluded that:
Despite multiple prior recommendations by
FERC and NERC, as well as annual reminders via
Regional Entity workshops, that generating units
take actions to prepare for the winter (and
providing detailed suggestions for winterization),
…. [multiple] generating units in [in Texas] still
did not have any winterization plans, and [eightyone] percent of the freeze related generating unit
outages occurred at temperatures above the unit’s
stated ambient design temperature. Generating
units that experienced freeze-related outages
above the unit’s stated ambient design temperature
represented about 63,000 MW of nameplate
capacity.57
Some have suggested that the use of “unprecedented” in the
context of the February 2021 storm is not applicable and will not shield
state officials and industry insiders from scrutiny when there are
precedents. FERC and NERC launched a staff inquiry even before the
February 2021 weather event had ended.58 In the final Report into that
inquiry, FERC and NERC concluded that:
[Comparisons of] the weather conditions of the
[February 2021] Event with past cold weather
events . . . makes clear that although the [February
2021] Event was unusually cold, severe cold and
freezing precipitation are far from unprecedented
5:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/22/texas-power-grid-extremeweather/.
55 Id.; Neena Satija & Aaron Gregg, Ten Years Ago, 241 Texas Power Plants Couldn’t Take the
Cold. Dozens of Them Failed Again This Year, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2021),
https://perma.cc/TE7W-J3AS.
56 Satija & Gregg, supra note 55.
57 FERC-NERC 2021 STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 17 (citation omitted).
58 See id. at 21 (citation omitted).
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for winter in the Event Area. For example, other
prior cold weather events had lower average daily
temperatures for some days during each event. For
two of the five events, Houston and Jackson
experienced at least one day for each of the weeklong periods where the average daily temperature
was below [ten] degrees, and Dallas and Jackson
experienced at least one day for each of the weeklong periods where the average daily temperature
was below [five] degrees. In all five events, average
daily temperatures were below freezing in Dallas,
Houston, and Jackson, for at least three days out
of the week-long periods. The 1983 event had
seven separate recorded cold fronts, while the
1989 event is still the coldest recorded winter in
the Houston and Galveston areas, with [fourteen]
days below freezing over two to three weeks, and
lows below those seen during the Event. The 1983,
2011 and 2018 events all had significant freezing
precipitation, like the Event . . . After each of the
four . . . events in the last ten years, one or more
of the Commission, NERC, and/or the Regional
Entities issued reports with recommendations to
prevent similar events from recurring.59
As one expert commented about the 2021 storm and its impact on Texas’
electricity supply, “[t]he freeze was easy to see coming. When I read that
this was a black-swan event, I have to wonder whether the folks who are
saying that have been in this business long enough that they forgot
everything, or just came into it.”60
Texas law now provides for winterization of its electricity supply,61
but reports question claims made by state regulators regarding the
preparedness of the Texas system for another hard freeze that like

Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
Tim McLaughlin & Stephanie Kelly, Why A Predictable Cold Snap Crippled the Texas Power
COMMODITIES
(Feb.
20,
2021,
7:46
PM),
Grid,
REUTERS:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-weather-texas-power-insight/why-apredictable-cold-snap-crippled-the-texas-power-grid-idUSKBN2AL00N.
61 See KIRKLAND & ELLIS, supra note 32.
59
60
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experienced by the state in 2021.62 Although regulators assured the public
that they had inspected 4,000 sites as of February 1, 2022, it is unclear what
these inspections confirmed since many were based upon written records
rather than on-site visits and since the relevant winterization standards
have not yet been promulgated.63 One skeptic suggested that the regulatory
inspection campaign was “more of a public relations stunt than a credible
regulatory effort.”64
● Fragility of Natural Gas and Electricity Supply Chains
Professors Baker & Coleman also contend that winter storm Uri,
the storm that caused the February 2021 Power Crisis, “revealed that the
interconnected natural gas and electricity supply chains can be fragile
because of their constant dependence on balancing supply and demand in
both markets.”65 If the Professors are referring to the vulnerability of any
type of infrastructure to disinvestment and planning, then, yes, all power
supply chains potentially are vulnerable. Perhaps they also are referring to
power supply chain vulnerabilities to cyberattacks, which also could be
described as making them fragile.66 However, in Texas, most of the causes
of a power supply chain’s fragility, assuming that I understand that term
correctly, seemingly are inherently baked into the state’s “model,” i.e., the
model’s competitive pricing structure, the grid’s lack of connection to the
national grids, and the state’s lack of appetite for regulatory oversight of
system operating entities.

See Mike Lee & Mike Soraghan, Documents Show Major Gaps in Texas Gas Inspections, E&E
NEWS:
ENERGYWIRE,
(FEB.
7,
2022,
7:21
AM),
https://www.eenews.net/articles/documents-show-major-gaps-in-texas-gasinspections/; Josiah Neeley, Risk to Grid Isn’t Sufficiently Addressed, THE MARSHALL NEWS
MESSENGER (Feb. 6, 2022), https://www.marshallnewsmessenger.com/opinion/guestcolumn-risk-to-grid-isn-t-sufficiently-addressed/article_6b61fe0a-86c9-11ec-ad098791915016f6.html (“The recent [February 2022] routine cold snap across Texas appears
to have caused a short-term natural gas supply interruption, with roughly a quarter of the
state’s natural gas operations going offline for a short period of time.”).
63 See generally Lee & Soraghan, supra note 62.
64 Id.
65 Baker & Coleman, supra note 1.
66 Geoffrey Morgan, Potential for Two Major Fuel Pipeline Shutdowns This Week Shows Fragility
(May
10,
2021),
of
North
America's
Energy
System,
FIN. POST
https://financialpost.com/commodities/energy/two-potential-shutdowns-of-majorfuel-pipelines-this-week-show-fragility-of-north-americas-energy-system.
62
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● The Exceptional Difficulty of Storing Natural Gas and

Electricity

The Professors state that “[t]he challenge . . . of natural gas is that,
like electricity, and unlike more traditional sources of energy such as coal
and uranium, it is exceedingly difficult and expensive to store.”67 This
statement is a bit more difficult to parse. Natural gas storage has long been
used, and its capacity is also subject to the economics of regulatory design.
However, lack of capacity is not synonymous with functional “difficulty.”
In the United States, there are numerous ways to store natural gas,
including types of three underground storage facilities: There are three
major types of underground geologic formations where natural gas storage
sites are found: (1) depleted oil and gas reservoirs; (2) underground salt
caverns, and (3) depleted aquifers.68 Natural gas also can be stored in
above-ground Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facilities69 or stored in the
pipeline system using a process called line packing.70 Accordingly, natural
gas storage is neither new nor uncommon, but investors may lack
incentives to invest in developing storage.71
Regarding the storage of electricity, the prevailing wisdom is that
it cannot be stored large-scale or that it is exceedingly difficult to do so.72
Baker & Coleman, supra note 1.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-89, NATURAL GAS STORAGE:
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO IMPROVE
SAFETY ENFORCEMENT PLANNING (2017), https://perma.cc/9TP5-UHYD.
69 See JAMES G. SPEIGHT, NATURAL GAS: A BASIC HANDBOOK, Storage: Chap. 5.4.4
(Katie Hammon ed., Gulf Prof. Pub., 2nd ed. 2018) (stating that gasholders or gasometers
also have served as storage for aboveground for natural gas); see also Sarah O'Carroll, So
the Oval’s Gasholder Will Survive. But Our Other Beautiful Gasometers Are Going, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2016, 10:53 AM), https://perma.cc/G49H-67XV (noting
gasholders or gasometers, although more often used overseas, have also served as storage
for aboveground for natural gas, with some even prized for their architectural and
heritage value).
70 See, e.g., Kody Kazda et al., Optimal Utilization of Natural Gas Pipeline Storage Capacity under
Future Supply Uncertainty, 139 COMPUTS. & CHEM. ENG’G 106882, at *2 (2020).
71 While FERC regulatory activity, specifically Order 636, tended to discourage
development in the gas storage sector, its 2006 Order 678 was designed to stimulate
investment in construction and expansion of natural gas storage. Rate Regulation of
Certain Natural Gas Storage Facilities, FERC Order No. 678, 18 C.F.R. pt. 284 (2006)
https://perma.cc/HCZ7-BT64.
72 See generally GEORG FUCHS ET AL., TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW ON ELECTRICITY
STORAGE 55 (Dirk U. Sauer et al. eds., 2012) (noting that it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish between storage and other sources that are capable of creating more flexibility
in a power system with more variable output due to the increasing use of renewables,
67
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However, it can be converted to other forms of energy capable of being
stored for later reconversion to electricity on demand.73 There are a variety
of storage systems for electricity, including batteries and pumped
hydroelectric storage, as well as the lesser-known flywheels and
compressed air.74 Newer forms of storage technologies are being
developed, such as flow batteries, superconducting magnetic energy
storage, and systems that hybridize two or more storage systems, including
the use of battery-super capacitor combinations in wind energy systems
for energy smoothing and grid integration or battery-fuel cell
combinations in hybrid wind and photovoltaic renewable energy
systems.75 According to recent data, the United States has more than
twenty-four gigawatts of electrical energy storage capacity;76 much of
that—ninety-four percent—is in the form of pumped hydroelectric
storage.77
Concluding Thoughts
Texas exceptionalism is certainly a large component of the official
promotion of that state’s electricity system and is an underlying theme in
the commentary of Professors Baker and Coleman. There are not,
however, as many non-Texans who find that state’s system to be the
“model” that Texans continue to promote, and the faith of even those
who are true believers has eroded after the system’s virtual collapse in
February of 2021.78
Professors Baker and Coleman appear to be among the steadfast
believers, however, and their hyper-silo-ized analysis is characteristic of
the rhetoric espoused by Texas officials and affected entities to avoid
with constantly fluctuating demand, and with unforeseen circumstances, such as the
Texas freeze. By way of example, the authors reference hydropower reservoirs as
dispatchable generation or as storage and note that hot water storage linked to heat
pumps or electrical heaters, while not technically designed as such, could also be defined
as storage or as a demand response solution if equipped with smart controls).
73 Id. at i.
74 See Ahmed Zayed AL Shaqsi et al., Review of Energy Storage Services, Applications,
Limitations, and Benefits 6 ENERGY REP. 288, 292 (2020).
75 See id. at 293–95, 299.
76 CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE SYSTEMS, UNIV. MICH., U.S. GRID ENERGY STORAGE
FACTSHEET 1 (2021), https://perma.cc/HDZ5-SBEY.
77
Electricity
Storage,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/energy/electricity-storage (last updated Nov. 22, 2021).
78 See generally Kyle Arnold, This Year’s Winter Storm Could Become the Costliest Weather Event
in Texas History, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 18, 2021, 3:33 PM),
https://perma.cc/8UJS-YX7A.
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acting upon the decades of warnings regarding system vulnerability. These
warnings, if heeded, would have provided at least some preparation for
the February storm, but the state’s firm denials of responsibility and
commitment to system so-called exceptionalism and isolation may lead to
more crises when the next “unprecedented” winter storm descends upon
the state.
Why is any of this a problem for those of us who were not in Texas
during the crisis and who did not lose family members or friends, lose our
power, or otherwise did not physically experience an impact? We care
because we are concerned about the safety and health of our fellow
citizens and because, while the failure of Texas’ grand “model” was
estimated to cost that state $130 billion in economic losses, it also cost the
rest of the U.S. $155 billion.79 While the February 2021 weather might not
have been unprecedented, the storm might “become the costliest weather
event in Texas history,”80 with damage estimates ranging from $195 billion
to as much as $295 billion.81
It is ironic, therefore, that, just weeks after Texas Republicans had
endorsed legislation advocating a referendum on secession from the
United States,82 Governor Greg Abbott sought an emergency federal
disaster declaration from President Biden.83 On February 14, 2021,
President Biden declared a state of emergency in all 254 Texas counties
and ordered federal assistance to supplement state and local response
efforts at a seventy-five percent federal funding level.84 Although Texas
See Busby, supra note 3. On study commissioned in 2013 by ERCOT after the 2011
winter event concluded that the value of lost load, or the value lost to the state’s economy
when power is off, was approximately $6,000 an hour for each megawatt that could have
been delivered. See Will Englund, et al., Texas, The Go-It-Alone State, is Rattled by the Failure
to Keep the Lights On, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/WU28-MBC8. In
February 2021, the numbers would have been breathtakingly higher—the state power
companies were estimated to be short by approximately 20,000 megawatts per hour, so,
$120 million an hour, or $2.8 billion a day. Id.
80 Arnold, supra note 78.
81 Irina Ivanova, Texas Winter Storm Costs Could Top $200 Billion—More Than Hurricanes
Harvey and Ike, CBS NEWS (Feb. 25, 2021, 3:59 PM), https://perma.cc/7J5H-4XHM.
82 See Kenya Evelyn, Texas Republicans Endorse Legislation to Allow Vote on Secession from US,
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2021, 1:17 PM), https://perma.cc/GS32-N296.
83 Fares Sabawi, Texas Governor asks President Joe Biden for Major Disaster Declaration for Winter
Storm, KSAT (Feb. 18, 2021, 2:47 PM), https://perma.cc/T3CA-ASUD.
84 President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Approves Texas Emergency Declaration, THE WHITE HOUSE:
BRIEFING ROOM (Feb. 14, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/02/14/president-joseph-r-biden-jr-approves-texasemergency-declaration/.
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refuses to subject its electrical system to federal jurisdiction, it certainly is
eager to receive federal funding to prop up that system’s failure.
Don’t expect any change of hearts in the Lone Star State, though.
Former Texas Governor and Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy
Rick Perry proclaimed that “Texans would be without electricity for longer
than three days to keep the federal government out of their business.”85
Apparently, independence has an “exceptional” Texas definition, and we
all are going to pay according to its definition, regardless whether our
understandings are the same.86
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